





WEAK SOLUTIONS TO AN ILLUSORY PROBLEM 
STEVEN N. KAPLAN†
In response to Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-
Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915 (2010). 
 
 
In Paying For Long-Term Performance, Professors Bebchuk and Fried 
describe how equity-based compensation in the United States should 
do a better job of tying top executive pay more closely to long-term 
performance.1  The primary assumption the authors and their pro-
posals make is that “standard executive pay arrangements . . . lead[] 
executives to focus excessively on the short term . . . at the expense of 
long-term value[,]”2 and do in fact “reward[] executives for short-term 
gains that do not reflect long-term performance.”3  They also heavily ref-
erence the financial crisis as a motivation for improving compensation.4
The recommendations and the article have two major shortcom-
ings.  First, Bebchuk and Fried provide little evidence to support their 
motivating assumption that executive-pay practices reward executives 
for short-term results that do not reflect long-term performance.  One 






Neubauer Family Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance, University of Chi-
cago Booth School of Business.  
 who is not known for his expertise on corporate gover-
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Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1915, 1915-16 (2010).  
2
Id. at 1917. 
3
Id. at 1916. 
4
See, e.g., id. at 1956 (“In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008–2009, there 
is a growing recognition among firms, investors, and public officials that equity-based 
compensation awarded to the top executives of public firms should be tied to long-
term results.”). 
5
See, e.g., id. at 1917 (noting Geithner’s urging of corporate boards to structure 
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nance (or taxation).  In reality, there is a great deal of evidence that 
top U.S. executives are paid for good long-term performance and pe-
nalized for poor long-term performance.  This is true for firms in 
general—nonfinancial and financial.  Even the claim on which Beb-
chuk and Fried focus—that top executive compensation was a first-
order cause of the financial crisis6
Second, Bebchuk and Fried tend to overstate the benefits of their 
proposals while understating the costs.  Because top executive pay is 
already effectively tied to long-term performance, the Bebchuk and 
Fried proposals, at best, provide marginal improvements to a system 
that already works well.  At the same time, they ignore the additional 
costs.  Their proposals require executives to bear more risk (from a 
lack of diversification) and are likely to dissuade some of the most ta-
lented executives from taking jobs at public companies in the first 
place.  This would be particularly true for top executives who can 
work for private-equity-funded companies (which do not impose such 
restrictions) as well as for lawyers who can choose between a law part-
nership and a general-counsel job.  In many cases, the costs of the 
Bebchuk and Fried proposals likely exceed the benefits. 
—is not supported by the evidence. 
In this Response, I expand on my arguments and present substan-
tial empirical evidence to support them.  Part I assesses the assump-
tion that executive pay practices, in general, reward executives for 
short-term results that do not reflect long-term performance.  Part II 
assesses whether the assumption holds for financial firms and whether 
compensation was a first-order cause of the financial crisis.  Part III 
considers whether the Bebchuk and Fried proposals improve on exist-
ing compensation arrangements.  The last Part concludes. 
I.  ARE EXECUTIVES REWARDED FOR GOOD AND PUNISHED  
FOR POOR LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE? 
Bebchuk and Fried claim that “standard executive pay arrange-
ments . . . lead[] executives to focus excessively on the short term . . . 
at the expense of long-term value[,]”7 and in fact “reward[] executives 
for short-term gains that do not reflect long-term performance.”8
 
compensation with an eye to long-term performance).  
  
They do not present empirical evidence that this is the case.  Rather, 
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Pay Master Kenneth Feinberg,9
If Bebchuk and Fried are correct, there should not be much of a 
relation between long-term stock performance and the pay that top 
executives realize in a particular year.  Joshua Rauh and I posed this 
exact question and found that, in reality, there is a strong relationship 
between top executive pay and long-term stock performance.
 who can hardly be considered serious 
scholars of corporate governance. 
10
Rauh and I took all the firms in the Standard & Poor’s Execu-
Comp database and sorted them into five groups based on size (as-
sets) for each year from 1999 to 2004.
 
11  There are more than 1600 
public companies in the ExecuComp database in any particular year.12  
We sorted based on size, because it is well established that pay is tied 
to firm size.13  Within each size group for each year, we sorted the 
CEOs into five groups based on how much compensation they actually 
realized—salary, bonus, restricted stock, and exercised options.14  It is 
worth mentioning that this measure of pay includes gains or losses 
from any of the gaming Bebchuk and Fried describe.15  We then 
looked at how the stocks of each group performed relative to their in-
dustry over the previous one, three, and five years.16
Actual compensation was highly related to firm stock performance 
over all three periods.  Firms with CEOs in the top quintile of actual 
pay were the top-performing quintile relative to their industries in 
every size group.
 
17  Firms with CEOs in the bottom quintile of actual 
pay were the worst-performing quintile relative to their industries in 




Id. at 1917-18. 
  Figure 1 (Figure 3 in the paper) presents the results 
graphically for three years of performance.  The results are graphical-
10
See Steven N. Kaplan & Joshua Rauh, Wall Street and Main Street:  What Contributes 
to the Rise in the Highest Incomes?, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1004, 1043-45 (2010).  
11
Id. at 1044. 
12
 See id. at 1008 (noting that there were 1747 companies in the database in 1994 
and 1722 in 2004). 
13
Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?, 123 
Q.J. ECON. 49, 50 (2008). 
14
Kaplan & Rauh, supra note 10, at 1008. 
15
See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 1936 (defining gaming as “springloading, 
selling on private information, and manipulating the stock price”). 
16
Kaplan & Rauh, supra note 10, at 1044. 
17
Id. at 1044-45. 
18
Id. at 1045. 
19
See id. at 1044-45 (noting that firms with CEOs in the top quintile of compensa-
tion outperform their industries by 61% on average). 
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ly, qualitatively, and statistically identical for five years20
 
—a period that 
most would characterize as long-term. 
FIGURE 1: THREE-YEAR PERFORMANCE RELATIVE TO  
VALUE-WEIGHTED INDUSTRY (CEOS ONLY) 
 
 
The previous analysis is across firms within a given year.  It also is 
possible to see the relationship across time.  Figure 2 presents the av-
erage pay realized by S&P 500 CEOs (adjusted for inflation) against 
the level of the S&P 500 from 1998 to 2008.  It is difficult to miss the 










See also Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas F. Cooley, Executive Compensation:  Facts 
13-15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15426, 2009) (finding qua-
litatively similar results).  A recent Wall Street Journal article also reaches a similar con-
clusion.  See Scott Thurm, Measuring Bang for the Buck:  Best-Paid Corporate Chiefs Tend to 
Deliver Above-Average Shareholder Returns, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2010, at B5. 
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FIGURE 2: REALIZED CEO PAY AGAINST THE  















The Bebchuk and Fried analysis also assumes that CEOs are not 
penalized much for poor performance.  Jenter and Lewellen studied 
this issue by examining CEO turnover for companies in the S&P Ex-
ecuComp database and found that boards aggressively fire CEOs for 
poor performance.21
For example, in a CEO’s first five years, 59% of CEOs in the bot-
tom quintile of industry-adjusted stock performance (over those five 
years) lose their jobs, compared to 17% of CEOs in the top quintile of 
performance.
 
22  Jenter and Lewellen find similar results for the fourth 
quintile versus the second quintile, with 51% of CEOs in the fourth 
quintile turning over, compared to 20% in the second quintile.23
The penalty for poor performance is even greater in companies 
with what Jenter and Llewellen refer to as “higher quality” boards—
smaller boards with fewer insiders and higher board stock ownership.  




The result for higher-quality boards is particularly interesting be-




Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen, Performance-Induced CEO Turnover 18-26 
(Feb. 2010) (unpublished draft), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~djenter/CEO_  
Turnover_February_2010.pdf.  
22
Id. at 26.  
23
Id. at 36 fig.2. 
24
Id. at 37 fig.3. 
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over the last twenty years, suggesting that governance has improved.25
To summarize the results in this Part, there is strong evidence that 
CEOs are compensated—both positively and negatively—for long-
term stock performance. 
  
Again, the performance measure is not short-term stock performance, 
but performance over a five-year period. 
II. DID POOR TOP-EXECUTIVE INCENTIVES  
PRECIPITATE THE FINANCIAL CRISIS? 
Bebchuk and Fried propose their solutions for two types of 
firms—financial and nonfinancial.  Their motivation, however, focus-
es heavily on financial firms and the financial crisis.  Bebchuk and 
Fried claim that the financial crisis has led to “widespread recognition 
that pay arrangements that reward executives for short-term results 
can produce incentives to take excessive risks.”26
The poor-pay-practice explanation for the financial crisis implies 
that “[t]op bank executives were rewarded for short-term results with 
large amounts of up-front cash pay,” “[b]ank executives did not hold 
sufficiently large amounts of stock to align their interests with those of 
shareholders,” and “[e]xecutives with more short-term pay and less 
stock ownership should have had the greatest incentive to take bad 
and excessive risks, and, so, should have performed worse in the cri-
sis.”
  The previous Part 
argued that there is little evidence that this is a systemic problem for 
firms in general.  In this Part, I argue that it is even questionable 
whether poor top-executive incentives at financial firms played an im-
portant role in precipitating the financial crisis. 
27
Fahlenbrach and Stulz tested these implications by studying the 





See also Steven A. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover 
Changed?  Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy CEOs 25 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W12465, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=924751 (finding a stronger rela-
tionship between turnover and performance than previous empirical studies). 
  
In 2006, the mean CEO took home $3.6 million in cash compensation 
26
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 1917. 
27
Steven N. Kaplan, Should Banker Pay Be Regulated?, THE ECONOMIST’S VOICE, 
Dec. 2009, at 1, http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol6/iss11/art6/ . 
28
Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis 
(Ohio St. U. Working Paper No. 2009-03-013, 2009). 
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(representing less than half of total compensation).29  The larger 
share of pay was in restricted stock and options.  At the same time, the 
mean CEO held $88 million worth of the firm’s equity and options.30  
In other words, the average CEO took home $3.6 million in cash while 
leaving more than twenty-four times as much money in his or her 
firm.  It seems unlikely that up-front cash pay provided much of an in-
centive for the average CEO to knowingly take bad or excessive risks 
that would jeopardize his or her much larger equity stakes and his or 
her job.  CEOs lost a great deal in the crisis.  From 2006 to 2008, the av-
erage CEO lost $31 million in stock value, dwarfing any gains from cash com-
pensation.  CEOs lost large amounts on their options as well.31
These (and additional) results lead Fahlenbrach and Stulz to con-
clude that bank “CEO incentives . . . cannot be blamed for the credit 
crisis or for the performance of banks during that crisis.”
 
32
Kevin Murphy presents a similar analysis for TARP and non-TARP 




David Yermack agrees that many prominent financial executives 
lost “small fortunes” in 2008.
 
34  He adds that “farther down the ladder, 
most mid- and upper-level managers of financial companies also lost a 
significant amount of their net worth in 2008.”35  Yermack concludes 
that “[t]he recent scrutiny of executive pay seems to stem from an odd 
mix of envy and vengeance, unsupported by facts or theories.”36
Murphy and Yermack, noted researchers on CEO pay, have writ-
ten articles highly critical of specific CEO compensation practices.  
Nevertheless, their conclusions on the relation of CEO pay to the finan-
cial crisis are diametrically opposed to those of Bebchuk and Fried. 
 
Benjamin J. Keys et al. studied mortgage loan origination and 
“d[id] not find any relationship between the quality of loan origina-
tions and top management incentives.”37
 
29
Id. at 34 tbl.3. 
  Instead, they found that “a 
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Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servcs., 111th Cong. 3-10 (2009) (testimony of Kevin J. Murphy, Chair in Finance, Uni-
versity of Southern California, Marshall School of Business). 
34
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that have lower default rates.”  They interpreted this result to suggest “that 
the moral hazard problem is less severe for lenders in which the risk man-
agement department has greater bargaining power within the firm.”38
To be fair, one paper is modestly favorable to Bebchuk and Fried.  
Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman studied whether short-termism leads 
to excessive risk taking in financial firms.
 
39  Partially because the tradi-
tional and intuitive measure of incentives Fahlenbrach and Stulz use is 
not correlated with excessive risk, Cheng et al. created a somewhat 
complicated and unintuitive measure of residual compensation.  They 
found that financial firms that paid higher residual compensation had 
modestly higher stock volatility and lower stock returns from 2001 to 
2008.40  The results on returns were driven largely by insurance 
firms.41  Even in their conclusion, however, Cheng et al. were not will-
ing to agree with the Bebchuk and Fried assumption and concluded 
that the modest relationship was not necessarily causal.42
Bebchuk and Fried do not mention any of these studies that fail to 
support their assumptions.  Rather, the only relevant evidence they 
cite is from Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann:  that executives at Bear 
Stearns and Lehman cashed out almost $2 billion of equity from 2000 
to 2008, an amount (slightly) greater than the value of their holdings 
at the start of 2008.
 
43
Unfortunately, that analysis leaves out one extremely important 
detail—taxes.  Most compensation in those firms was in the form of 
restricted stock.  When restricted stock vests, the executive owes taxes 
on the award.  For New York residents (including many of the execu-
tives), the combined federal and state marginal tax rate over this pe-
riod was well over 40% and as high as 50%.
  The inference they intend to make is that the 
Bear Stearns and Lehman executives knowingly behaved in a short-





  Is it surprising then, that 
39
Ing-Haw Cheng, Harrison Hong & Jose A. Scheinkman, Yesterday’s Heroes:  Com-
pensation and Creative Risk-Taking 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 16176, 2010). 
40
Id. at 3. 
41
Id. at 15-16. 
42
Id. at 28. 
43
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The Wages of Failure:  Executive 
Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 267-73 (2010).  
44
The top federal tax rate was 39.6% in 2000, 39.1% in 2001, 38.6% in 2002 and 
35% from 2003-2008.  TAX FOUND., U.S. FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX HISTORY, 
1913–2010 (2010),  
http://www.taxfoundation.org/publications/show/151.html.  The Medicare tax rate is 
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the executives sold a little more than 50% of their shares over the period?  
A large fraction of those sale proceeds undoubtedly went to pay taxes. 
To see this, suppose that an executive is awarded $100 million in 
restricted stock.  When the award vests, the executive owes $45 million 
in taxes. Now, let’s say the executive sells $50 million of the $100 mil-
lion vested stock.  In that case, $45 million would go to pay taxes and 
the executive would retain $5 million in cash.  At the same time, the 
executive would still hold $50 million in vested stock.  Net of taxes, 
then, the executive still has an extremely strong incentive to maximize 
long-term shareholder value.  Her remaining stock is worth ten times 
the cash she has realized. 
The Bebchuk et al. analysis inexplicably ignores taxes.  They as-
sume that the executive gets to keep the $50 million he sold (not the 
$5 million the executive really ends up with) while retaining $50 million in 
stock.  In their analysis, the executive has an incentive to take risks be-
cause he takes a lot of money out of the company.45
In other words, an after-tax analysis would likely find that the Bear 
Stearns and Lehman executives’ after-tax realizations from stock sales 
were on the order of 10% of what they lost on their remaining shares—
not the roughly equal amount claimed by Bebchuk et al.  This, by the 
way, is a general point applicable to the entire Bebchuk and Fried analy-
sis.  In ignoring taxes, they overstate the extent of the problem. 
  By ignoring taxes, 
Bebchuk and Fried greatly overestimate the amount of money execu-
tives actually realize.  At a 45% tax rate, they overestimate the amount 
by a factor of ten. 
If front-loaded incentives did not play a major role in the crisis, 
what did?  Taylor points to the highly expansionist monetary policy in 
the years leading up to the crisis.46
 
1.45% for employees and 2.9% for people who are self-employed. Social Security On-
line, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/taxRates.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).  
As of February 1, 2010, the New York State top marginal tax rate was 6.85% to 7.7%.  
TAX FOUND., STATE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES, 1913-2010 (2010) 
http://www.taxfoundation.org/taxdata/show/228.html.  In 2009, the New York City 
top marginal tax rate was 3.65%.  NYC Finance,  
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dof/html/services/business_tax_nys_income.shtml (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2010). 
  Diamond and Rajan cite the so-
called capital glut—large inflows of external capital from much of the 
45
See Bebchuck et al., supra note 43, at 271 (characterizing the value of remaining 
shares for Bear Stearns and Lehman executives as “relatively modest” and “non-
existent” respectively).   
46
See John B. Taylor, The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses:  An Empirical Anal-
ysis of What Went Wrong 2-5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14631, 
2009) (noting deviations by the Federal Reserve from traditional monetary policies 
employed during long periods of strong growth).  
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developing world.47  Calomiris highlights the role that the political sys-
tem played in inflating the banking sector and real estate prices, par-
ticularly the subprime sector, through mandates implemented by 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and others to promote low-income hous-
ing.48
In sum, Bebchuk and Fried’s claim that short-term top executive 
incentives led to excessive risk taking and strongly contributed to the 
financial crisis is not supported by the preponderance of the empirical 
evidence.  At best, it is debatable. 
  Ruling out compensation practices hardly leaves us at a loss for 
culprits in the recent debacle. 
III. DO THE BEBCHUK-FRIED PROPOSALS DELIVER  
BENEFITS IN EXCESS OF COSTS? 
In the first two Parts, I presented evidence that the problem Beb-
chuk and Fried assume is overstated.  Top executive compensation 
and turnover are, in fact, tied to long-term performance.  As a result, 
adopting the Bebchuk and Fried proposals can provide, at best, mod-
est marginal benefits to the existing governance arrangements that al-
ready work well.  At the same time, their proposals also impose addi-
tional costs.  This Part weighs the marginal benefits of the 
recommendations against the potential costs.  Bebchuk and Fried 
make recommendations in three general areas:  unwinding, hedging, 
and timing.  I address each area below. 
A.  Unwinding 
Bebchuk and Fried recommend that executives should be re-
stricted from unwinding equity-based awards and allowed to do so on-
ly gradually after vesting, subject to aggregate unwinding limitations.  
The idea is to make sure that executives have incentives to focus on 
the long-term stock price. 
Such restrictions might make sense for some executives at some 
companies.  But that Bebchuk and Fried claim a benefit fails to estab-
 
47
See Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram Rajan, The Credit Crisis:  Conjectures About 
Causes and Remedies 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14739, 
2009) (explaining that many emerging-market countries became net lenders of capital 
during the late 1990s). 
48
See Charles Calomiris, Banking Crises and the Rules of the Game 55 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15403, 2009) (suggesting that housing policies 
exacerbated incentives for subprime risk taking).  
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lish that there is a marginal benefit to this policy—and ignores the po-
tential costs. 
First, Bebchuk and Fried argue that by reducing unwinding, firms 
will not have to replenish equity grants and therefore can pay their 
executives less.49
Second, they acknowledge that many companies now impose 
some type of ownership guidelines on top executives.
  This makes no sense in a world where there is a 
functioning market for top executives.  Top executives will see to it 
that they are paid the going market wage.  It is not clear there is any 
marginal benefit here. 
50  They criticize 
these other ownership guidelines as ineffective, but do not provide 
any supporting evidence.  For example, Bebchuk and Fried criticize 
the guideline that executives must hold stock worth a multiple of their 
annual compensation.  They argue that these requirements are often 
too low and cite Procter & Gamble and Verizon as requiring their 
CEOs to hold too little company equity.51  But even those two specially 
chosen examples contradict the Bebchuk and Fried criticisms.  The 
CEO of Procter & Gamble, A.G. Lafley, in fact, owned more than $100 
million in stock and options52 while the CEO of Verizon, Ivan Seiden-
berg, owned more than $60 million.53
Bebchuk and Fried also criticize guidelines that require executives 
to hold a certain amount of stock until retirement.
  For both, the ownership stakes 
arguably provided substantial incentive to manage for the long term.  
It is hard to see much of a marginal benefit to making it more difficult 
to unwind those positions than it already is. 
54  They argue that 
this may encourage executives to retire early.55
 
49
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 1933. 
  While this may matter 
in a small number of cases, it is not clear that it matters much.  More 
importantly, it is not clear the Bebchuk and Fried proposal is any bet-
ter.  By requiring executives to remain undiversified for a long time, 
the Bebchuk and Fried solution also gives executives strong incentives 
to leave their current employers to work elsewhere.  Under their pro-
posal, a job-switching executive obtains the same total compensation, 
50
Id. at 1934. 
51
Id. at 1934-35. 
52
Procter & Gamble Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 42 (Aug. 
28, 2009). 
53
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 43 
(Mar. 23, 2009). 
54
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 1925-28. 
55
Id. at 1927. 
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obtains diversification, and probably is able to unwind more quickly 
from his or her first company. 
Furthermore, the Bebchuk and Fried pay proposals—increasing 
the period between the time stock is issued as compensation and the 
time it can be sold net of taxes56
The foregoing argues that there is unclear or little marginal bene-
fit to the Bebchuk and Fried unwinding proposals over current prac-
tice.  In addition, there are (at least) two important costs to the pro-
posals that Bebchuk and Fried do not mention. 
—would not have stopped the execu-
tives at Bear Stearns, Lehman, Merrill, and elsewhere from selling 
many of their shares before the crisis.  As I mentioned above, a large 
fraction of the selling by those executives was likely driven by tax pay-
ments which Bebchuk and Fried acknowledge are allowed under their 
proposal.  Under the Bebchuk and Fried proposals, many of the ex-
ecutives—Cayne (Bear Stearns), Fuld (Lehman), and  Lewis (Bank of 
America)—would have been eligible to sell a substantial amount of 
their remaining equity because they had long tenures and received 
large amounts of restricted stock and options in the 1990s and 1980s. 
First, as already mentioned, the unwinding proposals (and to 
some extent the timing proposals) make it more difficult for execu-
tives to diversify their personal portfolios.  This imposes additional (but 
difficult to quantify) costs on the executives.  One suspects some execu-
tives would choose to diversify by going to work for other companies. 
Second, it also seems likely that the restrictions would dissuade 
some of the most talented executives from taking jobs at public com-
panies in the first place.  This would be particularly true for top ex-
ecutives who can work for private-equity-funded companies (which do 
not impose such restrictions upon exit) and lawyers who can choose 
between a law partnership and a general counsel job. 
On the whole, then, Bebchuk and Fried fail to make a convincing 
case that their unwinding proposals improve much, if at all, upon cur-
rent practice. 
B.  Hedging 
Bebchuk and Fried recommend that top executives be restricted 
from hedging their equity positions.57
 
56
Id. at 1928-30. 
  This recommendation is sensi-
ble but, again, addresses a problem that hardly exists.  The net benefit 
57
Id. at 1954. 
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is negligible.  Bebchuk and Fried claim that “[a] recent empirical 
study by Bettis, Bizjak, and Kalpathy confirms the significance of the 
problem.”58  The fact is that Bettis et al. confirm the opposite:  very 
few companies now allow their top executives to hedge.  To see this, 
one has only to look at table 1 of Bettis et al.  In 2005 and 2006, the 
last two years they studied, an average of fewer than fifty firms each 
year allowed their executives to hedge.59  And roughly 20% of those 
hedges used exchange funds that the authors find have no negative 
timing attributes.60
C.  Timing 
  The paper, therefore, finds potentially costly 
hedging behavior in roughly forty public firms a year out of the more 
than 5000 companies publicly traded on U.S. exchanges.  This is a 
rate of less than 1%.  I would not call this significant. 
Bebchuk and Fried recommend making it more difficult for top 
executives to affect the timing of equity-based grants and equity-based 
realizations.61
CONCLUSION 
  Those recommendations are sensible and do not have 
any obvious costs.  But many companies already follow these recom-
mendations, suggesting there is a small marginal benefit to existing 
practices.  Many companies award options at set dates.  Many require 
equity sales to occur over time through 10b5-1 plans.  Fewer compa-
nies appear to require predisclosure of such sales.  To the extent 
companies do not follow these recommendations yet, they are well ad-
vised to consider them. 
On the whole, the Bebchuk and Fried proposals address a prob-
lem that is already largely solved.  Boards and compensation commit-
tees already pay a great deal of attention to motivating top executives 
to manage for long-term shareholder value.  Accordingly, most firms 
already implement policies that deliver most of the benefits of the 
Bebchuk and Fried proposals.  This is reflected in the strong empiri-
cal relation of top executive compensation and turnover to perfor-
mance—a relation Bebchuk and Fried do not acknowledge. 
 
58
Id. at 1951 (citing Carr Bettis, John Bizjak & Swaminathan Kalpathy, Why Do 
Insiders Hedge Their Ownership and Options?  An Empirical Examination (Mar. 
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1364810. 
59
Bettis et al., supra note 58, at 53 tbl.1. 
60
See id. at 6 (“[T]he evidence suggests that exchange funds are more likely to be 
used purely as a diversification strategy.”). 
61
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 1937-41. 
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The cost of these proposals (and articles like Bebchuk and 
Fried’s) is that they continue to treat CEOs and boards with more 
skepticism and hostility than is justified by the empirical evidence.  
That hostility diffuses to the media and the political arena, where it 
can have real and negative effects in leading to costly and unnecessary 
regulations.  Although it is difficult to quantify, there also can be little 
doubt that the hostility dissuades able executives from taking on top 
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